Migration scholars have frequently emphasized the tremendous increase in international migration in recent years. But several advanced industrial countries (Japan in particular) have relatively small numbers of foreign workers. Most of the literature on labor migration relates only to "positive" cases, i.e., countries that have actually experienced significant inflows of foreign workers. This paper proposes considering Japan as a "negative case" of labor migration in the post-World War II period. There has been much recent interest in the growing numbers of foreign workers in Japan, but what is most interesting about Japan is the fact that the numbers are relatively small (as a percentage of the labor force) and that they began to increase so late, in comparison to other countries. The main argument of the paper is that a proper theory of labor migration would distinguish between positive and negative cases. Doing so requires serious consideration of destination country political factors, in contrast to the economism of currently dominant approaches.
The issue of foreign workers in Japan has received a tremendous amount of attention from scholars in recent years. Much has been made of the fact that Japan, long the most significant anomaly among advanced industrial countries because it avoided large-scale use of foreign labor, is finally succumbing to the same pressures other countries experienced more than thirty years ago. Japan thus seems to confirm what many scholars believe, i.e., that foreign labor inevitably becomes a "structural" part of the labor force of advanced capitalist countries, not merely a temporary stop-gap or seasonal phenomenon.
In ten or fifteen years, perhaps, it might be possible to make this general argument, and to point to Japan as an important case confirming this belief. But such a conclusion is currently premature at best, and it relies on a highly questionable analysis of the Japanese experience as we currently know it --not as we might predict it will turn out, based on current trends.
The most important observations to make about foreign workers in Japan are that, as a percentage of the labor force, their numbers are small (relative to those in other countries) and that the current flows began relatively late. Even if we include the non-citizen Korean population, foreign labor in Japan constitutes not much more than 1.5 percent of the Japanese labor force. When we compare Japan to Western European and other advanced countries, where the foreign share of the labor force sometimes exceed ten percent (in the mini-states of Luxembourg and Liechtenstein the figures exceed forty percent), what emerges is that Japan still stands out as a minor user of foreign labor. Moreover, the current influx that has attracted so Japan and Labor Migration 2 2 Before World War II, of course, Japan forcibly imported millions of workers from countries in the region. Most of these workers returned home after the war. much attention began only in the mid-1980s --long after Japan became an economic powerhouse with very high growth rates and high standards of living. On these grounds, I offer the following assertion (which I will defend further as the paper progresses): Japan in the post-World War II period has not been a significant host country for foreign labor, and it does not belong in the same category as other countries that have long used imported workers, such as Germany and France.
2 Some observers do begin by noting that the foreign presence in Japan is small. But most of those who write on the subject then go on to ask and answer the following question: why are there foreign workers in Japan? Given that the numbers in Japan have been increasing, this approach is understandable: we want to understand an emerging trend. It is, however, the wrong question, or at least not the most interesting one. The real question is, why are the numbers so small, and why have they remained small for so long? This paper addresses this question specifically in relation to Japan's experience of labor shortages from 1967 until 1974 (when the oil crisis and the world-wide recession dramatically reduced the demand for labor), but many of the points I make are in principle applicable to later periods as well.
One lesson offered here is that addressing the issue of international labor migration properly requires an expanded framework that incorporates "negative" cases, i.e., instances in which countries have used other approaches to ensure that employers do not lack the necessary labor. Most of the literature on labor migration relates only to "positive" cases, i.e., countries that have actually experienced significant inflows of foreign workers. There has been much discussion in the literature about the rapid increase in international migration and the increasing Japan and Labor Migration 3 inability of advanced capitalist, liberal states to control their borders. The increase in movement is impressive, but we should not forget that the vast majority of the world's population stays put and that, from the outside, the rich countries appear remarkably closed (Brubaker 1994) .
Migration is in some respects the exception. Thus it should be a basic methodological axiom that if we want to know why some countries become recipients of large populations of foreign workers, we also have to know why other countries have experienced only small influxes of such workers. Much of the theoretical work on international labor migration stumbles in this regard, failing to invoke factors that distinguish positive from negative cases (cf. Moore 1966) . Studying Japan in this context can provide a useful corrective, in particular by way of forcing us to rethink what kinds of questions we ask concerning labor migration. To improve our answer to the question, What causes labor migration?, we should ask, Why are there many foreign workers in some countries and only relatively few in other countries?
Before the Oil Shock -Was Japan Different?
The question of Japan's limited use of foreign labor becomes especially compelling when we focus on one of Japan's most extraordinary periods of high growth rates, i.e. the late 1960s and early 1970s (the so-called Izanagi boom). This was the period in which significant labor shortages first became apparent. It was also perhaps the first time in the post-war period in which the Japanese government considered, but rejected, the idea of importing labor from abroad (Evans 1971 , Sellek 1994 . This period seemed to combine the elements that had led other countries to turn to imported labor to resolve shortages. Japan in the pre-oil-shock years, then, might stand as a major anomaly relative to the tendency in many advanced industrial countries Japan and Labor Migration 4 to import foreign labor. The proportion of foreign labor in the Japanese labor force remained in the range of 1.5%, while in other industrial countries the percentage rose to a much higher level (see Table 1 ). Moreover, most foreign workers in Japan were long-term Korean residents who had entered the country prior to World War Two. They have long held jobs with lower status and lower pay, and this fact is no doubt related to social discrimination as well as to their distinct legal status as noncitizens (Komai 1995) . On the other hand, they were never "temporary" guestworkers of the classical European type.
But was Japan in the 1960s and 1970s really in the same situation as other industrial countries? Many analysts of this period point out that one of the reasons Japan did not import workers was that it had another alternative: Japanese workers from rural areas. Perhaps a country that could draw on its own citizens for labor cannot really be said to have experienced a labor shortage. In addition, perhaps Japan was quite different from other countries in other respects as well, e.g. economic growth rates, unemployment rates, inflation rates, etc. --all of which could have helped determine whether Japan "really needed" foreign labor. We need to consider these issues seriously before designating pre-oil-shock Japan as an anomaly concerning foreign labor.
In this section I therefore present and analyze data to highlight the similarities and contrasts between Japan and some other advanced industrial countries, especially regarding the labor force.
From Table 2 , we see that Japan indeed had a substantially higher proportion of its labor force employed in agriculture in 1960, around the time when some European countries began importing labor. For any given year through 1970, Japan's proportion in agriculture was more than twice that of Germany, for instance.
( Table 2 about France and Germany in the early 1960s. In any case there is no doubt that the period of "unlimited labor supplies" had ended before the late 1960s: Minami (1986) places the "Lewisian turning point" somewhere around 1960, noting that some observers placed that point even earlier (wrongly, in his judgement).
The proportion of the Japanese labor force employed in agriculture in 1969 (18.6%) is higher --though not outrageously --than the comparable figure for West Germany in 1961 (13%), but it is lower than the French figure for 1961 (21.4%) ( Table 2) . In other words, the "reserves" of French workers employed in agriculture were proportionately greater than those of Japan, at the time each country confronted the problem of insufficient labor supply --but this fact did not keep the French government from sanctioning the recruitment of foreign workers. The fact that Japan could draw on reserves from agriculture was undoubtedly one of the factors that enabled the country to avoid importing labor. But the mere availability of surplus agricultural workers does not explain why Japan actually adopted this particular solution for alleviating labor shortages.
It may be that Japan had other reserves of labor as well, so that it was not as difficult to tap other domestic supplies of labor as in other countries. Possible candidates might include Japan and Labor Migration 6 women not in the labor force, men not in the labor force, and unemployed persons. The data show, however, that Japan had fewer such persons to draw on than other countries. Overall labor force participation rates (Table 3) were higher in Japan in 1969 (65.6%) than in France (55.7%) or West Germany (60.1%) in 1961 --in the case of France, significantly higher. Female labor force participation rates (Table 4) as well were much higher in Japan than in other countries: 50.1% in Japan vs. 41.5% in West Germany (again, 1969 vs. 1961) . (If data were available for France in the early 1960s, they would surely show an even greater difference.) Japanese female labor force participation rates were even higher than those for Sweden throughout the 1960s, though the Swedish rate surpassed the Japanese rate in 1971. Unemployment rates (Table 5 ) for all countries in the 1960s reveal that there were very few people looking for work who did not find it: Japan's rate was only marginally higher than West Germany's throughout this period. On these measures, then, France, West Germany, and Sweden had more candidates in the domestic population for activation into the labor force than Japan --yet the former countries turned to foreign labor while Japan did not.
( Tables 3, 4 , and 5 about here)
There is of course a difference between transferring labor from one economic sector to another and pulling inactive people into the labor force. The former are already active, while many of the latter are probably inactive for a reason and might well resist efforts to mobilize them. One of the most common ways of explaining the labor migration "problem" is to point out that there are jobs citizens are simply unwilling to do: citizens and foreign workers are said to be complementary, not competitive. This view, however, is too static: while citizens might not 7 take jobs that foreigners accept, the real issue is whether such jobs would continue to be characterized by poor conditions and low pay if foreigners were not available. If employers perceived that they had no choice but to hire citizens for certain jobs, they might be forced to make those jobs more attractive.
Thus while it may seem unlikely that non-participating citizen women are good potential substitutes for foreign workers, the Swedish government in the late 1960s deliberately tried to decrease the need for foreign labor by encouraging more women to enter the labor force.
"Encouragement" meant not exhortation but policy changes, including expanded community provision of child care and tax policy changes that penalized single-earner households (Cook 1978) . The West German government, on the other hand, chose a different path: supporting "traditional family" roles for women and refraining from policies that would have facilitated working on the part of mothers (Kamerman 1979) . The share of foreigners in the West German labor force rose to a rather higher level than in the Swedish labor force (9.8% in 1973 for Germany, 5.7% in 1976 for Sweden -see Table 1 ). Female labor force participation was certainly not the only factor accounting for the difference, but it seems unlikely that raising participation rates (in West Germany, for example) would have no effect whatsoever on the demand for foreign labor. Japan arguably had fewer possibilities for this option, given that its female (and overall) participation rates were already higher than those of the other countries described here.
Another potential objection to the argument that Japan was in a situation substantially similar to that of other countries experiencing labor shortages might be that the Japanese economy was less developed and therefore had less of a "structural" need for foreign labor.
Again, however, the (admittedly crude) data do not support this objection. In constant terms Japan and Labor Migration 8 (1990 prices, 1990 exchange rates), the Japanese per capita GDP in 1969 was higher than the French and German figures for 1961: US$11,135 vs. US$9,165 and US$9,248. In addition, economic growth rates, expressed as increases in per capita GDP (Table 6 ), show that the Japanese economy was expanding substantially faster than the other economies, perhaps indicating that the Japanese demand for labor was expanding faster as well.
( Table 6 about here) Some writers have held that the labor shortage was not serious, and their arguments need to be considered. Galenson and Odaka (1976) point out that the proportion of wage and salaried workers was much lower in Japan than in many western European countries. [But compare the right years.] Boltho (1975) argues that the "shortage" related mainly to young workers, while there were plenty of available older workers; employers wanted to hire the former but had to make due with the latter.
In both cases, the point made is that there were, in fact, significant labor reserves. I have not tried to argue here that there were not reserves. Rather, I have defended two points: First, the reserves were not obviously of a different order of magnitude from those of other countries that did import labor. And secondly, and partly as a consequence, the availability of labor reserves does not suffice to explain why they were in fact used. When analysts of Japan claim that the reason Japan did not import labor is that the country had labor reserves, they are implicitly claiming that there is a "tipping point" of some sort: when labor reserves "run out", a country needs foreign labor, and Japan still hadn't reached that point in this period. I do not argue in this section that such an argument merely puts the "tipping point" in the wrong quantitative place; instead, I have presented data to show that the concept itself is problematic as an explanation for the absence of labor migration (and, therefore, for the presence of foreign workers as well).
In sum, then, if we compare Japan to other countries for the relevant years, we see that:
the Japanese economy was growing more rapidly and was at a level of development comparable to other, labor importing countries; the proportion of Japanese workers employed in agriculture was well within the range of other countries; and labor force participation, both overall and female, was higher than that of other countries that had already imported significant numbers of foreign workers. Thus the argument that Japan refrained from bringing labor from abroad because it had domestic labor reserves is at best incomplete and at worst does not stand up at all to comparative investigation. Japan did resolve labor shortages in this period by drawing on reserves of labor; but given that other countries might have done the same but did not, the real issue then becomes explaining why and how Japan followed this path. On these grounds Japan stands as a significant anomaly, having avoided importing labor through the high growth years of the late 1960s and early 1970s despite labor shortages that were arguably at least as severe as those experienced earlier by labor-importing countries.
Official and Private Perceptions of the Problem
Even though Japan did have a sizeable agricultural labor force that would eventually be transferred to other sectors, this transition took place too slowly to satisfy the needs of many employers, partly because many of those working in agriculture were rather older and not inclined to take urban jobs (Dore 1986 ). There was a prolonged period in which the available labor force was simply insufficient to meet demand. The active openings-to-applicants ratio was quite high for a number of years and in fact was higher during this period than in the late 1980s, when the number of foreign workers in Japan started to increase significantly (Table 7) .
Analyses of Japan in the early 1970s (e.g. Reubens 1981 , Mori 1997 usually read as if the labor shortage were a single event that was resolved with a single-stroke solution: Japan had a labor shortage during a boom period, but this shortage was solved through recourse to labor from agricultural or other reserves. In fact, however, this was a prolonged period of economic difficulty for many individual employers, regardless of the fact that the economy as a whole was growing quickly.
( Table 7 about here) Official and private publications from the period abound with references to "severe" and "critical" labor shortages. In the latter half of 1967 wages began rising at a faster rate than productivity (Labor Ministry White Paper, 1970-71) . According to a 1969 Labor Ministry report, ten percent of firms surveyed reported that they had had to idle part of their production facilities because they could not get enough workers (Oriental Economist, May 1969) . Fifty percent of firms surveyed predicted they would not be able to get enough suitable labor in the future, and another 38% said they would get enough labor only if they were not choosy about whom they got.
Another Ministry survey later that year revealed that 80% of manufacturing enterprises reported they were unable to proceed with planned expansions simply because they couldn't get enough labor (Oriental Economist, August 1969).
Japan and Labor Migration 11
The problems became more severe in subsequent years: a Labor Ministry White Paper from 1971-72 reported that openings for skilled workers were being filled at a rate of 19.8% and that the absolute number of openings was close to 2 million. Forecasts for later years were pessimistic: the Labor Ministry projected that if economic growth was to continue at an annual rate of 10% from [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] , the shortfall of workers would reach 4.1 million (relative to a labor force of around 50 million (Labor White Paper 1972-73) . In other words, it was not possible for the economy to continue to grow at such a rate, given population and labor force constraints. The government explicitly recognized that labor shortages would become a serious constraint on future economic growth (e.g. MITI White Paper on International Trade, 1970).
There was, at least in some parts of the government, a remarkable willingness to adjust growth rate expectations downwards because of labor supply constraints.
The [Economic and Social Development Plan, adopted March 1967, for fiscal years 1967-71] set the growth rate at about 8 per cent per annum.... The establishment of this comparatively low growth rate was due to the expectation that the labor market, particularly that for young labor, would become smaller. (Miyazaki 1970: 377) As Miyazaki notes, Japanese economic plans have tended to underestimate real growth potential: actual growth consistently exceeded estimates in the plans. Still, the fact that the government was willing to allow perceived labor shortages to dictate reduced prospects for economic growth stands in marked contrast to the path followed by many European countries --where growth was maintained in part by importing large amounts of labor.
From one angle, perceptions of this sort mattered more than reality itself: following W.I.
Thomas, we should consider that to the extent the labor shortage was perceived as real by important interest groups, then that perception was real in its consequences. The importance of Japan and Labor Migration 12 3 These sources refute Cornelius's claim (1994) that the Japanese government simply never considered importing labor at this time.
Japan's labor reserves was diminished by the widely held notion that such workers were not in fact available or were unsuitable, whether because of age, gender, training, or location. Japanese employers resisted the ideas of extending the retirement age, retraining older workers, and employing more middle-aged women. They expressed preferences for different solutions, based on the reality they saw.
What many employers in fact wanted was that the government would allow them to import workers from abroad. The phenomenon of bringing in workers under the guise of "trainees" began during this period, and the Labor Ministry announced plans to create an official program along these lines (though involving a mere 5000 workers), with the explicit acknowledgement that doing so would also help alleviate labor shortages (Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 October 1970) . The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry adopted a resolution in 1970 urging the government to explore the option of importing labor. And the government's response was not altogether negative: a section of the Economic Planning Agency announced that in 1970 that it would study the option in relation to its impact on future economic growth (Japan Economic Journal, 8 December 1970) . In addition, the Economic Council, an advisory group in the Prime Minister's office, discussed the foreign worker question as it formulated a "New Economic Social Development Plan for 1970 -1975 " (Japan Economic Journal, 14 September 1971 . 3 In the end, however, a significant foreign worker program did not emerge during this period.
The difficulty found additional concrete expression in a very significant datum: the transfer of income from capital to labor, partly as a result of labor's enhanced bargaining position Japan and Labor Migration 13 in a tight labor market. Even after the first oil shock, Japanese unions negotiated very large wage increases in 1974:
The result --coming at a time when the disruption of the oil and commodity price rises and the efforts to control inflation were putting heavy brakes on the growth in output --was not only to fuel inflation but also to maintain and even increase real wages in spite of reduced average working hours, thus effecting a sizeable shift in the proportion of national income going to wages at the expense of profits. This once-and-for-all shift has never been fully undone.... (Dore 1986, 101-2) As is evident from Table 8 , the dramatic shift in 1974 was a continuation of trends of previous years. It was fueled by the fact that wages for unskilled workers were increasing in the 1970s almost as much as wages for skilled workers (Minami 1986) . Moreover, labor's increasing share in the national income was anticipated (e.g. Japan Labor Bulletin, September 1973, citing a Labor Ministry White Paper). That is, not only did the transfer happen, but many observers believed it would happen. It would be difficult to argue that these shifts were unrelated to the shortage of labor, though of course other factors were probably implicated as well, e.g. the 1971
"Nixon shock". Inflation, declining (relative) profits, and production bottlenecks were precisely the kinds of problems that resorting to foreign labor was designed to resolve in other countries, given labor shortages and expanding economies. Why was Japan (i.e., employers and the government) unwilling to adopt a policy measure that had successfully accomplished these goals in other countries?
( shortages. We have seen that the shortage was perceived as a real problem that had to be addressed in some manner. Solutions actually advocated by the government and adopted by employers included automation and other means of increasing worker productivity and output;
exporting some types of production to low-wage countries; hastening the mobilization of "reserve" labor into the urban labor force; allowing inflation to increase as labor shortages contributed to increasingly militant wage demands; and, as we have seen, allowing the transfer of income from capital to labor. Some of these changes derived not only from the labor shortage but from other problems and goals as well. But each of them also had the effect of alleviating the labor shortage and thus diminishing the pressure for importing labor.
Productivity increases during this period were almost without parallel (with reference both to other countries and to other times in Japanese economic history). Annual rates of productivity increases averaged 11 percent from 1960 through 1970 and returned to that level in 1972 after a recession-induced dip in 1971. In 1973 productivity increased by 19.8 percent (the increase exceeded 20 percent in the manufacturing sector) (Galenson and Odaka 1976) . This was a period of rapid growth in automation and robotics.
This was also the period in which Japanese direct foreign investment abroad began to increase significantly, partly as a result of the labor shortage (Sekiguchi 1979) . The cumulative total of investment abroad was US$3.6 billion in 1970 and increased by 287 percent over the next three years, to US$ 10.3 billion. More than half of this investment was directed to low-wage developing countries (especially in Asia) and consisted of labor-intensive production in consumer goods industries making standardized products. In addition, almost half of the number of investments were made by small-or medium-sized firms (Kojima 1983 ). On both counts it is clear that many of the firms investing overseas were precisely the ones that were having difficulty finding workers in Japan. Moreover, the export of capital was well controlled by the Bank of Japan (and thus by the government itself).
Another way in which employers coped with the labor shortage was to mobilize domestic labor that was either employed in other firms or sectors or not in the labor force. There was much discussion in policymaking circles about the need to increase labor mobility among firms (in part by deemphasizing traditions of "lifetime employment" and seniority-based wage formulas --see various Labor Ministry White Papers from the period). Another much-discussed topic was the need to facilitate continued working by older workers, i.e., those who had been forced to "retire" at age 55. Middle-aged women were also increasingly seen as potential workers, and there was a government-business drive to increase female labor force participation, including a slogan ("Harmonizing Family and Work") and an effort to improve child-care facilities for working women. 4 In fact, participation rates for women decreased during this period, as they did in other advanced capitalist countries, but they might have decreased even more had the government allowed employers to import workers.
Employers' ability to cope with labor shortages was also enhanced by relatively flexible labor practices. Unions in Japan are weaker than many of their western counterparts, and there is little emphasis on "work rules" of the American type. It is not at all uncommon for Japanese workers to learn and perform many different tasks within the firm (Dore 1986) . This flexibility could well have helped employers shift workers from less essential tasks to more directly productive activities.
Finally, there is a certain sense in which we can say that an additional (governmental) response to the labor shortage was to do nothing, simply to let employers suffer. Suffering, of course, took the form of wage increases, lost opportunities for expansion, and even production cutbacks --all as described above. Such cases represented opportunity costs for investors: in a situation in which more labor was available, investors would likely have made greater profits.
Moreover, these opportunity costs thus came as a direct result of government policy --the policy not to permit imported labor in large quantities.
It would grant far too much coherence to government policy-making to argue that there was a grand design here, that the government developed a comprehensive approach to labor supply problems comprising the above elements. There were many other economic policy concerns at the time, and the measures adopted had numerous purposes: Japanese investment abroad, for example was part of a process of "internationalization" that was designed to advance foreign policy goals (Higashi and Lauter 1990) . Moreover, some of the responses described (e.g. automation and investment abroad) were private sector responses, actions that firms took as part of their profit maximizing strategies given a certain economic and regulatory environment. But each of those elements played a role in alleviating the labor shortage itself or its effects, such that most employers could continue to operate and make a profit even though cheap foreign labor was not available. In this sense the Japanese economy followed a qualitatively different path from most Western European economies. Moreover, this path did have a certain degree of coherence insofar as its components derived in part from the government's refusal to allow firms to import labor: from one point of view, all the above policies or choices were substitutes for foreign labor, even if they were not necessarily intended as such.
Explaining the Japanese Path
Constructing a theoretical explanation for Japan's limited use of foreign labor would involve finding a combination of factors that did not characterize the countries that did import labor under similar circumstances. This sort of comparative work would require extended discussion of other cases and will not be attempted here. I propose instead to accomplish two more limited goals. First, I will briefly raise questions about existing theories of international labor migration, questions that arise precisely through consideration of the Japanese case. And second, I will note some of the factors that were most likely to have made Japan different.
Several traditional theories of labor migration, developed to explain positive cases in western countries, encounter difficulty when applied to Japan (as a negative case). If the theories presumed to explain labor migration to other destinations also invoke factors that characterize countries where numbers of migrant workers are small, then clearly something is amiss with those theories. Neoclassical theory, for example, emphasizes development gaps (especially as expressed in wage differences) between sending and (potential) receiving countries. But the disparities between Japan and many of its neighbors were at least as great as those between European "guestworker" countries and the countries that sent workers to Europe. In the end, of course, those gaps undoubtedly contributed to the initiation of migration flows from, say, Peru, Pakistan and China to Japan. But clearly development gaps alone do not explain labor migration:
they must work in interaction with other factors.
Dual labor market theory (e.g. Piore 1979) does not fare any better. Here, labor migration is supposed to arise from the demands expressed by employers for foreign labor, given that citizens are unwilling to take unattractive jobs in the secondary sector of the economy. But Japan's economic dualism has been widely recognized (e.g. Pempel 1978 , Calder 1988 and is if anything more pronounced than that of many other industrial countries. Large firms are usually well insulated from seasonal and other variations in demand for their products, and the smaller firms that bear the brunt of demand variation have indeed often found it difficult to find workers at wages the firms can afford to pay. But the latter's demands for foreign workers have, especially until recently, gone unanswered by the government --indicating that demand for foreign labor does not automatically bring about its satisfaction (cf. Bohning 1984) . The factors invoked by world-systems theory (e.g. Sassen 1988 ) also characterize Japan, which has long had (ex-)colonial relations and trade ties with many of its neighbors. None of these theories is by any means wrong or useless --but insofar as the factors they invoke also characterize Japan, the story they present is at least incomplete.
We have already seen why some of the explanations commonly offered for Japan's limited use of foreign labor are, at least on their own, unsatisfactory (especially the idea that the country had domestic reserves of labor). Another common idea is that Japan refrained from importing labor because of an inherent aversion to foreigners in Japanese culture, something that induced the state to adopt a policy against foreign labor. This idea is useful to some extent, but it is too voluntarist. It would not be difficult to discern an aversion to foreigners in other (labor importing) countries and even to find an expressed desire (on the part of state officials and politicians) to avoid using imported labor. Japanese culture may provide a reason why policymakers wanted to avoid foreign labor, but it does not provide a sufficient explanation of why they chose such a policy and were able to implement it.
A focus on state policy, however, leads in the right direction. Clearly the fact that there was very little foreign labor in Japan is rooted in the state's decision not to allow employers to import workers in large numbers. We then need to explain this policy decision. The preferences of policy makers were important but not sufficient. In addition, what most likely mattered in Japan was the ability of the state to implement these preferences, especially when powerful private interests could have profited from a different policy (e.g. imported labor). We need to explore some of the foundations of this capacity.
Economic policy in Japan has long been distinguished by the location of decision-making:
most major decisions were made by the bureaucracies, not by the Diet (Johnson 1982 , Fukui 1972 , Knoke et al. 1996 . This was especially true through the late 1960s and early 1970s, the period discussed in this paper. Bureaucrats generally concerned themselves less with the profitability of particular companies and more with the long-term trajectory of the economy.
This approach was facilitated by long-term single party rule: the political environment was relatively stable, such that policy-makers in the bureaucracies could implement their decisions without fear that a new government would try to impose a different direction or philosophy (Pempel 1978 (Pempel , 1990 . A new government would have found it difficult to impose its will on the bureaucracies in any case, as the latter are insulated to a high degree from political control:
political appointments to the ministries number only about two dozen, compared to the one thousand or so appointments made by US presidents. The ministries are instead staffed by cohesive, highly educated elites, chosen by a process widely seen as meritocratic (Johnson 1982) .
Civil servants are said to be concerned with formulating policies that "can meet a national interest test rather than a clamorous opportunity test" (Wade 1990: 373-4) . Moreover, the ministries have numerous powerful tools to manipulate economic incentives such that private economic actors' behavior can be pushed in certain directions (Johnson 1982) .
Business does have a central role in economic policy-making in Japan, but that the policymaking process is dominated in most circumstances by big business, through its powerful peak associations' representation on the various government-sponsored economic councils. Small business, frequently excluded from this part of the process, bears the costs associated with many decisions (Pempel 1978) . Calder (1988) argues that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) usually courts small business interests in response to political crises but notes that there was no such crisis in the late 1960s. The LDP's poor election showing in 1972 prompted compensatory measures for small business, but these measures included tax and loan concessions, not a change in labor policy, even though small businesses were much harder hit by the labor shortage in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Big business could better afford to pay higher wages to keep its labor rolls filled and had a variety of means of ensuring labor market flexibility (Taira 1970) ; small business was squeezed and would have benefitted greatly from access to cheap foreign labor but was unable to translate its demands into policy. Small business, then, had no alternative but to hire workers that were not considered desirable (women, older workers) and to invest in increasing productivity (Nakamura 1995) .
Thus a partial explanation for the Japanese government's (anti-) foreign labor policy is that those who stood to benefit most from imported labor were often systematically excluded from the policymaking process. This argument should not be overstated, however: smaller firms are usually suppliers to larger firms, and if costs for the former increase, those costs must be passed on at least in part to the latter. Conversely, large firms would no doubt be very interested in an option such as cheap foreign labor that would lower costs for their suppliers. Thus the more important factor that most likely explains the low numbers of foreign workers in Japan is the bureaucracy's capacity for implementing its economic policy preferences, against the interests of organized business.
These claims concerning the power of the Japanese state are contested (for critiques, see e.g. Samuels 1987 , Friedman 1988 , Richardson 1997 . But they seem to fit well with the fact that the Japanese government refrained from adopting a significant guestworker program in spite of employer demands to do so. An important piece of the explanation for Japan's autarkic approach to labor policy, then, consists of its mode of economic governance, and in particular its ability to impose its policy preferences on the business sector.
By 1975, economic recession had essentially brought an end to the (perception of) labor shortages: there was an abundance of labor at least until 1987 (Nakamura 1995) , and the question of foreign labor disappeared from the political agenda for over a decade. By the late 1980s, however, the mode of economic governance in Japan had evolved to the extent that the bureaucracy's ability to resist demands for importing labor had perhaps been somewhat diminished. The locus of decision-making was shifting: beginning as early as 1972, politicians gained in influence at the expense of the bureaucracies (Johnson 1989, Murumatsu and Krauss 1987) . This shift is at least consistent with the fact that the government began to open a "side door" to foreign workers (Sellek 1997) . On the other hand, the government continued to encourage steps that reduce the demand for low-end foreign labor, such as foreign relocation of some firms and mobilization of inactive segments of the population (Mori 1997) . Foreign labor, though increasing, remained a much smaller percentage of the Japanese labor force, relative to other advanced capitalist countries.
These remarks, however, are intended mainly as ideas for exploration, not as a proper theoretical explanation. Generally speaking, developing a theoretical explanation for Japan and Labor Migration 22 international labor migration would require careful comparative historical work that includes discussion of positive and negative cases together, in the same framework. Theoretical advances in this area are likely to come from paying closer attention to political processes and structures in the destination country (see also Bartram 1998) . Such factors have received scant attention in the literature on the initiation of labor migration flows; integrating them into our analyses is likely to facilitate the development of theories that distinguish between positive and negative cases.
Conclusion
One important lesson from this comparative treatment of Japan is that the initiation of international labor migration flows is not determined by economic or demographic forces alone.
There is no fixed point in the process of economic development at which domestic labor supplies and economic growth combine to create an ineluctable necessity for foreign labor. Instead, such forces combine to create challenges and opportunities for interested parties, who then act strategically to advance their interests as they perceive them. The importation of foreign labor is to a certain extent a matter of state policy in the destination country (and in some cases in the sending country as well). Whether "labor shortages" result in labor migration depends in part on the extent to which those actors who would benefit from it --mainly employers --have the political clout to overcome opposition from those who oppose it. (Of course, much also depends on the migrants themselves, who often overcome host country resistance to their desire for better economic opportunities --and migrate/work illegally.) Employers can sometimes press their position and get their way even when there are other feasible solutions, or when the labor Japan and Labor Migration 23 shortage is not "real". Much depends on the manipulation of discourse and on the prevailing mode of political struggle. In the Japanese case, employers were in fact not able to get what they wanted during the period analyzed, even though they (and perhaps the Japanese economy as a whole) might have profited greatly from it, at least in the short run and in narrow economic terms. Japan thus presents an important contrast to other countries, especially in Western Europe, where importing labor has long appeared as a "natural" part of economic development.
This contrast should inform the particular questions we ask about international labor migration. 
